Massacre in Srebrenica The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica

The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica

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Schmeisserom protiv srpske mitomanije

Srebrenica: genocide of Bosnian Muslims

How Balkan wars started, history, timeline…
An exhaustive investigation bosed on hundreds of interviews, confidential UN documents, and US. government cables. Endgame, by Pulitzer Prize winner David Rohde, exposes those responsible for the July 1995 fall of the world’s first UN-declared “safe area” and the death of 7.000 Bosnian Muslim men. The book highlights both US. and UN negligence and unveils new evidence that the commander ofthe UN forces in the former Yugoslavia may Intenlionally have allowed the world’s first UN-protected civilian “safe area” to be sacrificed.

Using previously unknown accounts of private UN meetings, Endgame reveals that French general Bernard Janvier, the senior UN corrsnander in the former Yugoslavia, repeatedly recommended that the UN abandon Srebrenica and two other UN “safe areas” for Muslim civilians in eastern Bosnia. Janvier’s standing orders from the UN Security Council (Resolution 536) were to use “the necessary measures, including the use of force,” to defend the safe areas. But the night before Srebrenica fell, Janvier turned down a crucial request from UN peacekeepers in Srebrenica for NATO close air support to bait attacking Bosnian Serbs. Janvier cited darkness, a pause in the Serb attack, and a telephone call with General Zdravko Tolimir as his reasons. “He says they do not intend to take the enclave,” Janvier told his aides. “I believe him. If I’m wrong I’ll draw my conclusions in the morning.” Srebrenica fell the following day Janvier then called for the UN to withdraw from the two remaining safe areas in eastern Bosnia. Finally, in a previously unknown July 4 letter, Janvier instructed his subordinates not to use NATO close air support to protect the UN safe area of Zepa. Eleven days later, Zepa’s defenders finally succumbed to better-armed Serbs after NATO planes failed to appear.

The conclusion is that either Janvier carried out his own recommendation to abandon the safe areas with the permission of the UN Security Council or he was incompetent. Endgame calls on Janvier, who has refused to speak publicly, to voluntarily explain his actions during what is arguably the darkest hour in United Nations history, or be compelled to do so.

In their first interviews, Dutch peacekeepers and Bosnian Muslim survivors present additional evidence of Bosnian Serb Army commander General Ratko Mladic’s tight control over Bosnian Serb troops which killed an estimated 3,000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners in mass executions and 4,000 mostly unarmed Bosnian Muslims as they fled the fallen enclave. A detailed portrait of Mladic’s megalomania and hatred of Muslims emerges from previously unknown speeches and conversations with Muslim refugees and UN peacekeepers. On the day he took Srebrenica, Mladic stated in an interview with Serb television that he intended to exact revenge on Muslims in the area for Serbs killed in an uprising 150 years ago. Mladic, apparently emboldened by the West’s repeated failure to stand up to him militarily, mocked Dutch peacekeepers after the town fell, called them his “prisoners,” and told Muslim negotiators, “Allah can’t help you now but Mladic can.”

U.S. and UN intelligence failed utterly in identifying the threat posed to Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces gathering around the enclave. Interviews with American diplomats and intelligence officials reveal that even on the day the town fell, U.S. and UN analysts were misjudging Bosnian Serb intentions. Several weeks before the faIl of Srebrenica, officials in the National Security Council privately discussed early versions of an “end game strategy” that involved the Muslim-led Bosnian government trading the three UN safe areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde to the Serbs. But U.S. officials have denied that they intentionally or tacitly allowed Srebrenica and then Zepa to fall to the Serbs. No concrete evidence that U.S. officials were involved in a secret conspiracy to sacrifice Srebrenica or Zepa has been found, but a secret cable from U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith pleading with U.S. officials to save Zepa exists; it was ignored. Endgame details the poor performance of both U.S. intelligence and UN peacekeeping operations. Both bureaucracies–especially UN peacekeeping–are seemingly in need of major reform.

UN officials either did not grasp the extent of the atrocities or were apparently unconcerned. The civilian head of the UN peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, privately complained to aides about negative media coverage the day after Srebrenica’s fall. “It would help,” Akashi said, “if we had some TV pictures showing the Dutch feeding refugees.” While having lunch with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic a month after Srebrenica’s fall, Akashi asked, “Do you see bear and deer from the deck we’re on?” Milosevic’ replied, “Yes, from time to time, but there’s no hunting next to the lodge. You have to go one or two kilometers away.” Akashi then made a joke. “A safe area for animals,” he said. The entire table burst out laughing.

Srebrenica should not have fallen. The failure of UN commanders to call in NATO close air support and the Bosnian Army’s questionable decision to pull out Srebrenica’s commander and its top fifteen officers for retraining resulted in the rapid collapse of the town’s defenses. The fall of Srebrenica was not just a case of the United States, Britain, and France ignoring yet another distant atrocity. The international community stripped the town’s Muslim defenders of tanks and artillery and then turned them over to their potential executioners. The actions of the Clinton Administration and its allies aided, encouraged, and emboldened the executioners.

The investigation has found that most Bosnian Serbs were not involved in the torture and executions that occurred after Srebrenica’s fall. The Bosnian Serb leadership cultivated an atmosphere of nationalism and revenge through state-controlled media, and a minority of Serb ultra-nationalists appear to have carried out the atrocities. The fact that the majority of Serbs were not involved in the bloodletting makes comprehensive war crimes trials in the former Yugoslavia all the more important. For peace to last, nationalists on all sides must confront the crimes carried out by their leadership, and individuals, not groups, must be blamed for the atrocities, as was the case in Germany after World War II.

Over 7,O00 U.S. troops are risking their lives and billions in taxpayer dollars are being spent on a peace in Bosnia that is widely expected not to hold. A new round of violent retribution–this time led by Muslims seeking revenge–is likely in Bosnia once U.S. troops depart. Western leaders may try to shrug off a new conflict as part of “ancient ethnic hatreds,” but these will be hatreds enhanced by a U.S. policy of promising justice but failing to deliver it.

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In 1996, Rohde was awarded the 1996 Pulitzer Prize in foreign reporting and George Polk, Overseas Press Club, Sigma Delta Chi, Livington and investigative Reporters and Editor awards for his stories in the Christian Science Monitor that helped expose the Srebrenica massacres. Some of the key documents below have been kindly supplied to us by David Rohde.On June 9, 1995, General Bertrand Janvier, General Rupert Smith, and Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) Yasushi Akashi met in Split, Croatia. This meeting in effect sealed the fate of Srebrenica and led directly to the betrayal of the Safe Haven to General Ratko Mladic and the subsequent massacre. In the transcript of the meeting, Janvier and Akashi continually argue against Smith’s effort to plan resolute measures to protect the enclave. After three years of consistent atrocities in areas taken by Mladic, and after Serbian nationalist broadcasts and threats of revenge, the statements of Janvier and Akashi are almost inconceivable. Thus, at one point, Janvier made this haunting remark:

16. The Serbs need two things: international recognition, and a softening of the blockade on the Drina. I hope that these conditions will be met quickly, given the urgent situation. I think the Serbs are aware of how favorable the situation is to them – I don’t think that they want to go to an extreme crisis. On the contrary. they want to modify their behavior, be good interlocutors. It is for this that we must speak to them – not negotiate, but to show them how important it is to have a normal attitude.

For the full transcript of this fateful dialogue, see
Transcript of the June 9, 1995 Meeting at Split: Akashi (SRSG), Janvier, and Smith

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The following is an excerpt from the wire sent by the US Embassy in Sarajevo.Department of State (Declassified Document)12 Jun 1995

FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0377
INFO AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSON USNATO IMMEDIATE
USMISSON USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

1. Entire Text

Summary: Prime Minister Silajdzic drained and downcast called me in twice July 11 to inform me of the spiraling crisis in Srebrenica and to criticize U.S. policy on lift END SUMMARY

2. Prime Minister Silajdzic called me in on an urgent basis at 1400 July 11 to discuss developments in Srebrenica. We said we had spoken with the mayor of Srebrenica by radio 0600 this morning. The mayor asked “is my city under death sentence?” The mayor had radioed and signed off “this is my last call. This is the end.”

[FOLLOWING EIGHT LINES OF TEXT BLACKED OUT BY CENSOR]

COMMENT: The PM gave a local radio interview after our meeting at 10. he called me in to criticize U.S. policy. END COMMENT

[FOLLOWING FOUR PARAGRAPHS OF TEXT BLACKED OUT BY CENSOR]

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Srebrenica Time Table
May 23-24, 1995:	Bosnian Serb army seizes heavy weaponry from UN depots.
May 25-26:	NATO air strikes hit Serb nationalist weapons depot at Pale.
May 25-30:	Serb nationalists take 270 UN hostages, later seize at least 100 more.
June 2:	U.S. Pilot Scott O’Grady shot down. (Rescued without capture, June 8.) Bosnian Serb nationalists release 121 hostages, take 45 others.
June 3:	Bosnian Serb army captures Srebrenica outpost.
June 4:	UN Gen. Bernard Janvier meets Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic to discuss release of hostages for end to NATO air strikes.
June 7:	Serb nationalists release 111 hostages.
June 9:	UN Special Representative Yasushi Akashi announces UN will abide by “strictly peacekeeping principles,” i.e., no use of force.
June 13:	Serb nationalists release about 118 hostages.
June 18:	Serb nationalists release all remaining hostages.
July 6:	Serb army attacks Srebrenica.
July 11:	Serb army captures Srebrenica.
July 12-18:	In mass-executions or ambushes, Serb army and militias kill up to 8,000 Srebrenica men and boys.
Aug 8:	In executions or ambushes, Serbs kill up to 8,000 Srebrenica men and boys.
Aug 10:	U.S. Ambassador to UN Albright reveals CIA proof of mass executions of Srebrenica males.

For an excellent report by Roy Gutman on the fall of Srebrenica, and the role of the UN, please follow this link.

David Rhode of the Christian Science Monitor wrote a series of stories on the Srebrenica Massacre that won him the 1996 Pulitzer Prize. These stories include:

See also the major Srebrenica page at Domovina Net, with archives, human rights and war crimes reports, information on cultural heritage, and photographs.

This page is placed to commemorate the massacre of approximately 8,000 Muslim men and boys, and the torture, rape, and killing of many women and children, which occured from July 12 through July 18, in and near the UN declared “safe area” of Srebrenica. The massacre was carried out after the commander of the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), General Bertrand Janvier, refused to carry out UNPROFOR’s mandate to defend the Safe Area and handed it over to Serbian army General Ratko Mladic.

New as of November 2004:

Call Him Packet Man: Ljubisa Beara, Srebrenica’s Academician of Death, an article by Emir Sulajic in Dani, Posted by the Bosnian Institute.

RS Commssion Acknowledges Approximately 7,800 Bosnjiak Boys and Men Massacred at Srebrenica

Ethnic Cleansers’ Worst Nightmare; Complete Report of the Srebrenica Commission 19 June 2004,30

Another Srebrenica Mass Grave Excavated: Kevljani

More Srebrenica Victims Found in Mass Graves

New as of October 2004: The Unfolding Shame of Radovan Karadzic:
More Mass Graves Found in Srebrenica-Bratunac Area June 2004
New Incidents at Konjevic Polje Near Srebrenica, cite of RS Persecution, Ethnic Cleansing, and Extermination

New as of May 2003: Srebrenica, apparatus of denial collapsing. 1) Momir Nikolic, pleads guilty and describes extermination porgram. 2) 20 May 2003: Dragan Obrenovic pleads guilty, details exterminations. Excerpt: “He {Ostoja Stanisic} was angry as the last group of prisoners were not taken to the dam to be executed, but were executed right there at the school and that his men (the 6th Battalion Rear Services) had to clean up the mess at the school, including the removal of the bodies to the dam.” See also the IWPR report on the Obrenovic plea.

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Transcripts of the French parliamentary hearings on Srebrenica, with new materials added regularly. Included already is the December 14 2000 testimony of Admiral Lanaxade and a copy of confidential cable z-1020 sent by Yusaki Akashi to Kofi Annan. The cable (in English) details Akashi’s meeting with SlobodanMilosevic on the July 17, 1995. Also included are press reviews, testimonies of survivors and much more.

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For the International Criminal Tribunal Indictment against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva convention at the “Safe Haven” of Srebrenica, see The Srebrenica Indictment

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Click here for the Christian Science Monitor’s Pulitzer Prize winning reports by David Rohde.

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Click here for A Cry from the Grave.

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For a meticulously detailed and gripping account of the complicity between United Nations Commanders and Officials, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and Serbian army General Ratko Mladic in the Srebrenica massacre, see Bianca Jagger, “The Betrayal of Srebrenica,” The European, 15 September – 1 October 1997, pp. 14-19, copyright Bianca Jagger. Bianca Jagger has been honored for her 20 years of work on human rights by Amnesty International. She has worked throughout the world, from Nicaragua to Northern Ireland, collating evidence and producing reports on issues of human rights.With Ms. Jagger’s permission we post the entire text of this important article here, in two parts. This text begins with an account of the background of the tragedy, the actual atrocities as represented in the Tribunal indictments and eyewitness testimony of survivors. The article then articulates the details of:

• the secret deal between General Janvier and General Mladic made in Zvornik on June 4, 1995, prior to the massacre;
• the June 9 conversation among Yasushi Akashi, Janvier, and General Rupert Smith;
• the intrigue and collaboration among Akashi, Mladic, and Milosevic as the massacre was occurring;
• the handing over by the Dutch Battalion of unarmed Muslims to Mladic as Dutch commanders drank champagne with General Mladic;
• the Dutch Battalion’s supplying of fuel for General Mladic to drive away his captives for torture and execution;
• General van der Wind’s debriefing of July 13 and the beginning of the attempted cover-up.

The article places the details of the complicity within a larger moral vision and exposes the stakes for all of us when genocide is appeased and facilitated. It quotes Tribunal President Cassese’s eloquent defense of the importance of the Tribunal and of justice. The end of the article also includes a chilling account Bianca Jagger’s recent trip to Srebrenica and the nearby extermination sites.

Bianca Jagger, “The Betrayal of Srebrenica,” part 1
Bianca Jagger, “The Betrayal of Srebrenica,” part 2

World greatest forum

Schmeisserom protiv srpske mitomanije

Srebrenica: genocide of Bosnian Muslims

How Balkan wars started, history, timeline…

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